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CRIMINAL LAw-EvmENcE-WIRETAPPING-Suspecting that petitioner and 
others were violating state narcotics laws, New York police tapped petition~ 
er's telephone pursuant to a warrant obtained in accordance ·with New 
York -law.1 Acting upon information thus gained the police apprehended 
petitioner's brother. In his possession was· found, not the narcotics as· 
suspected, but alcohol without the tax stamps required by federal law.2 
This evidence was turned over to federal authorities. Prosecution for 
possessing and transporting distilled spirits without tax stamps thereon 
followed, during which petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence· 
obtained through the wiretap ·was denied. The Second Circuit affirmed· 
the conviction,8 holding that although the evidence was obtained in 
violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,4 it was 
~dmissible. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, 
reversed. Evidence obtained solely by state agents in violation of section 
605 is inadmissible in federal courts. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 
96 (1957). . . 
In a companion case, a person expecting a threatening telephone call 
from petitioner requested state police to listen in over a regularly installed 
extension telephone. They did so, and the testimony of those officers as to 
the conversation was admitted on the petitioner's trial for violating 
federal law.5 His conviction was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.6 On 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two justices 
dissenting.7 Section 605 was not violated because there was no "inter-
ception" within the meaning of the statute. Thus the testimony was 
admissible. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). 
Section 605 is essentially a proscriptive pro~ion, forbidding the inter-
ception and divulgence of a communication. It can be criminally8 and 
civilly9 enforced. The plain language of the second clause10 renders it 
naturally suitable as an exclusionary rule of evidence.11 As a rule of 
evidence, it does not supersede contrary state rules in state court proceed-
lN.Y. CoNsr., Art. I, §12; N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §813-a (1942). 
2 In violation of LR.C., §§5008(b)(l) and 5642. 
8 United States v. Benanti, (2d Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 389. 
4 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §605. 
5 Rathbun was convicted of transmitting a threatening interstate communication 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. (1952) §875(b) and (c). 
6 Rathbun v. United States, (10th Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 514. 
7 Justice Frankfurter and Douglas argued that there was an "interception" unauthor-
ized by "the sender." 
8 United States v. Gruber, (2d Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 307. 
9 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 691. 
10 "[N]o person not being authorized by -the sender shall intercept any communication 
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning 
of such intercepted communication to any person. • • ." 
11 Section 605 was originally applied as a rule of evidence in Nardone v. United 
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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ings.12 Its application in federal courts, however, prohibits both testi-
mony as to the substance of an intercepted message18 and evidence obtained 
as the "fruit" of such an interception, at least when the existence of the 
wiretap has been disclosed.14 The exclusionary rule applies to intrastate 
as well as interstate messages.1is 
In deciding the Benanti case below,16 the Second Circuit approved the 
evidence offered, relying on a Supreme Court intimation that evidence 
obtained in violation of section 605 should be accorded the same treat-
ment as evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.17 It 
was reasoned that Fourth Amendment considerations18 apparently permit 
the introduction in a federal prosecution of evidence obtained solely 
by state authorities in a search and seizure unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,19 at least where federal officers do not cooperate,20 
and when the search is not solely to enforce federal law.21 Since neither of 
these latter two considerations was present it followed that state-secured 
evidence obtained in violation of section 605 should also be admissible, 
and sixteen decisions, in seven of which certiorari had been denied, were 
cited to that effect. The Court nevertheless found the statute to require 
a contrary result, and went out of its way to observe: "It has remained an 
open question in this Court whether evidence obtained solely by state 
12 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). But see Matter of Interception of Telephone 
Communications, 170 N.Y. S. (2d) 84 (1958), where a memorandum opinion apprised 
enforcement and prosecuting officers that authorizing orders for wiretapping within 
New York would henceforth be denied notwithstanding the state statute. The court 
based its decision on a .holding that the Benanti case and §605 are the supreme law 
of the land. The court says, "[Benanti] tolls the knell of all wiretapping, including 
so-called 'legal' wiretapping, in our State.'' People v. Dinan, 172 N.Y.S. (2d) 496 (1958), • 
where a lower New York court indicates that -Benanti may ·have changed the result on 
the Schwartz facts; Burack v. State Liquor Authority, (E.D. N.Y. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 161, 
where the federal court relied upon Benanti to enjoin the use of state wiretap evidence 
before a state administrative tribunal. 
13 Nardone v. United States, note 11 supra. 
14 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). But see the Benanti case at 100, 
note 5. 
111 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
16 Benanti v. United States, note 3 supra. 
17 "Although the unlawful interception of a telephone communication does not 
amount to a search or seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, we have applied 
the same policy in respect of the prohibitions of the Federal Communications Act. • • .'' 
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 at 120 (1942). 
18 It is generally assumed that the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914), is not required by the Fourth Amendment, although this question 
remains open. See Justice Black's concurring opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 
25 at 39 and 40 (1949). 
19 See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 
74 (1949). The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures although not the 
Weeks exclusionary rule have been read into the Fourteenth Amendment as restrictions 
on the states. Wolf v. Colorado, note 18 supra. 
20 See Byars v. United States, note 19 supra; Lustig v. United States, note 19 supra. 
21 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). 
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agents in an illegal search may be admissible in federal court despite the 
Fourth Amendment."213 Therefore the real significance of the Benanti 
case may be to portend a change in the previously understood scope of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Section 605 clearly condemns the "interception" and _divulgence of a 
communication, unless authorized by "the sender."22 Prior to the Rathbun 
case, lower federal courts had indicated that both parties to a telephone 
conversation were alternately senders and receivers, and that authorization 
by both was therefore necessary to remove an interception from the proscrip-
tion of the statute.23 Other lower courts had indicated that where a third 
party overhears a conversation on an extension telephone with the consent 
of one party, there is no "interception" within the meaning of the statute.24 
The Court accepted the latter position, therefore avoiding the problem of 
who is a "sender," arguing that Congress could not have intended that 
the word "interception" included the normal business and social practice 
of allowing third parties to listen in on extension telephones.25 This result 
seems sound. Since the recipient of the phone call here could testify to 
its contents, keeping a police officer who overheard the conversation from 
testifying would only prevent corroboration of the recipient's testimony, and 
could not prevent disclosure of the contents of the,conversation.26 This same 
consideration would suggest that evidence obtained with consent of one 
party by use of a device other than an extension telephone should also 
be admissible. If' such a device were used, however, the Court might have 
more difficulty in finding no "interception," and would then face the 
problem of who is a "sender."27 Finding any listening-in consented to by 
either party to the conversation, regardless of the method used, not to be 
an "interception" would avoid this problem, and would seem to be both 
a permissible and desirable construction of the statute. 
The two cases seem to complement each other. Benanti protects the 
individual from invasion of the privacy of his telecommunications by state 
agents, at least to the extent that federal exclusionary rules of evidence 
may do so. Rathbun, however, makes clear that such protection will be 
accorded only in cases where the individual's privacy is in fact threatened 
21aBenanti case at 102, note 10. 
22 Note 10 supra. 
23 E.g., United States v. Polakoff, (2d Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 888; United States v. Hill, 
(S.D. N.Y. 1957) 149 F. Supp. 83. 
24 E.g., United States v. White, (7th Cir. 1956) 228 F. (2d) 832; Flanders v. United 
States, (6th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 163. 
25 Rathbun case at 109 to 111. 
26 It is assumed that a caller or recipient of a call who would request the police to 
listen in on a conversation would also be willing to testify in court, although •the same 
rule should follow even if he would not do so because of, for example, fear or intimidation. 
21 Section 605 incorporated into the Federal Communications Act the almost identical 
provision found in the Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44-2 Stat. 1172, thus explaining the 
presence of the words "sender" and "intercept." 
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by the wiretap, which is not normally the case when state police are re-
quested to monitor the conversation by the other party, who can testify to 
its contents.28 The results in both cases, therefore, can be commended. 
James A. Park 
2s See note 26 supra. 
